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TORTS
I. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
A. Charitable Immunity Abolished
In Fitzer v. Greater Greenville South Carolina Y.M.C.A., 1
the South Carolina Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of
charitable immunity, holding that a charitable institution is sub-
ject to the same liability for its tortious conduct as any other
person or corporation.2 This decision places South Carolina in
the large majority of American jurisdictions that have ruled on
this issue.'
The plaintiff attended Camp Greenville, which was operated
by Greater Greenville South Carolina Y.M.C.A. While at camp,
he was injured by a rock thrown by another camper, and
brought a negligence action to recover damages for the injuries
sustained. The trial court granted a summary judgment to the
defendant, holding that the suit was barred by the doctrine of
charitable immunity. On appeal, the supreme court reversed.5
The court first held that summary judgment was inappro-
priate because there was a genuine issue of material fact6 as to
whether Camp Greenville was a commercial venture, to which
charitable immunity would not apply.7 Although the case could
1. - S.C. -, 282 S.E.2d 230 (1981).
2. Id. at -, 282 S.E.2d at 231-32.
3. E.g., Ray v. Tucson Med. Ctr., 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951); Malloy v. Fong,
37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Haynes v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n., 241 Iowa 1269,
45 N.W.2d 151 (1950); Noel v. Menninger Found., 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954);
Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960); Mulliner v. Evange-
lischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N.W. 699 (1920); Collopy v. Newark Eye
and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958); Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417
Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965); Friend v. Cove Meth. Church, 65 Wash. 2d 174, 396 P.2d
546 (1964); Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp. 149 W. Va. 705, 143 S.E.2d 154 (1965).
4. The plaintiff's mother, in her affidavit opposing summary judgment, stated that
she did not know the camp was allegedly a charitable institution and obtained liability
insurance through the camp. - S.C. -, 282 S.E.2d 230.
5. Id. at -, 282 S.E.2d at 230.
6. Jamison v. Howard, 271 S.C. 385, 247 S.E.2d 450 (1978).
7. - S.C. at -, 282 S.E.2d at 231 (citing Eiserhardt v. State Agric. & Mech.
Soc'y., 235 S.C. 305, 111 S.E.2d 568 (1959)).
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have been reversed at this point, the court found the critical is-
sue to be continued adherence to the doctrine of charitable im-
munity.8 Referring to its recent decision limiting the doctrine,9
the court observed that immunity was out of step with the gen-
eral trend of legislative and judicial policy to distribute the
losses incurred in the operation of an enterprise among those
who received its benefits.10 Noting that the abolition of the doc-
trine in other jurisdictions had not led to the demise of charities,
the court emphasized that arguments supporting the rule could
no longer withstand judicial scrutiny." The court also pointed
out the inconsistencies inherent in a doctrine that permits an
institution to be organized for the dispensation of aid to others,
and at the same time denies that aid to those whom it has in-
jured in the course of its activities. 12 Concluding that stare deci-
sis was an insufficient reason to follow a rule that no longer
served a legitimate purpose,'3 the supreme court abolished -the
doctrine of charitable immunity.
14
The doctrine originated in England in 1861,1' and was soon
after introduced into the United States. 6 Almost from its incep-
8. - S.C. at -, 282 S.E.2d at 231.
9. Brown v. Anderson County Hosp. Ass'n, 268 S.C. 479, 234 S.E.2d 873 (1977).
10. - S.C. at -, 282 S.E.2d at 231, (citing Brown v. Anderson County Hosp.
Ass'n., 268 S.C. at 486, 234 S.E.2d at 876).
11. - S.C. at -, 282 S.E.2d at 231 (citing Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa.
486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965)).
12. - S.C. at -, 282 S.E.2d at 231 (citing Geiger v. Simpson Meth-Episc. Church,
174 Minn. 389, 396, 219 N.W. 463, 465 (1928)).
13. The court noted that the availability of liability insurance underscored the "un-
reasonableness" of continued adherence to the rule. - S.C. at -, 282 S.E.2d at 230
(citing Brown v. Anderson County Hosp. Ass'n., 268 S.C. at 491, 234 S.E.2d at 873).
14. - S.C. at -, 282 S.E.2d at 232-33.
15. Holliday v. St. Leonard's, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861). The rule was quickly repu-
diated. Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, 6 L.R.-Q.B. 214 (1871).
16. McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1976). For further dis-
cussion concerning the importation of the doctrine to the United States from England,
see Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960). Jurisdictions adopt-
ing the doctrine based their decisions on several rationales: (1) the trust fund theory
(funds of a charity are held in trust for the beneficiaries and the diversion of the funds to
pay tort claims would defeat the charitable purpose of the institution). E.g., Anderson v.
Armstrong, 180 Tenn. 56, 171 S.W.2d 401 (1943); (2) the nonapplicability of respondeat
superior to charities (charity does not derive any profits from the services of its employ-
ees whereas other enterprises are established for the benefits of a master who is
benefited financially by having servants). E.g., Blackman v. Y.W.C.A., 179 Wis. 178, 191
N.W. 751 (1922); (3) the assumption of risk or waiver theory (a person who accepts the
benefits of a charity agrees to waive the liability, assert no tort claim against the benefac-
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tion, the courts began limiting the effects of the rule.17 By 1971,
only three states, including South Carolina, adhered to the unal-
tered doctrine. 18
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court appeared hesi-
tant for some years to unilaterally modify such a firmly en-
trenched doctrine, 9 the absence of legislative action forced it to
take the initiative. Recent South Carolina decisions had already
severely limited the scope of the rule, piecluding immunity (1)
when the activity generating the liability was predominantly
commercial;20 (2) for intentional torts;21 and (3) for hospitals
tor, and assumes the risk of negligence). E.g., Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints
Hosp. 59 Idaho 350, 82 P.2d 849 (1938); and (4) the public policy theory (public policy
should encourage charitable institutions, and it is better for the community at large to
bear the loss rather than the individual. E.g., Hearns v. Waterbury Hosp., 66 Conn. 98,
33 A. 595 (1895).
17. See supra note 3.
18. Maine, New Mexico, and South Carolina. Although Maine has the doctrine in its
complete form, the Maine legislature has limited its application to charities that do not
carry liability insurance. If a charitable institution carries liability insurance, the institu-
tion is deemed to have waived immunity for the amount of the insurance during the
period of coverage. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 158 (1964). The Maine Supreme Court
has since refused to abrogate the doctrine because the legislature relied on the doctrine
when it enacted § 158. See Mendall v. Pleasant Mountain Ski Dev., 159 Me. 285, 191
A.2d 633 (1963).
In the only New Mexico decision, Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 766, 527
P.2d 1075, 1078 (1974) defendants claimed charitable immunity, but the New Mexico
Supreme Court did not reach that argument. South Carolina adopted the rule in Lindler
v. Columbia Hosp., 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914). Lindler applied only to cases where
the charitable institution's negligence was the result of acts of its servants selected with
care. Id. at 28, 81 S.E. at 513. In Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S.C.
197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916), the court held it was also contrary to public policy to hold a
charitable institution responsible for the negligence of its servants, agents, employees or
superior officers selected without due care.
See generally, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 994 (4th ed. 1971).
Other forms of the doctrine that have been adopted by states are the imposition of liabil-
ity where it is apparent the assets of the charity will not be depleted by the plaintiff's
recovery, such as where there is liability insurance. See, e.g., Anderson v. Armstrong, 180
Tenn. 56, 171 S.W.2d 401 (1943). Some courts deny liability to recipients of benefits of
the charity, but allow recovery to others. E.g., Alabama Baptist Hosp. Bd. v. Carter, 226
Ala. 109, 145 So. 443 (1933). Others have abolished charitable immunity in connection
with hospitals, but allow it to remain in connection with other charities. E.g., Rabon v.
Rowan Mem. Hosp., 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967).
19. Belton v. Richland Mem. Hosp., 236 S.C. 446, 211 S.E.2d 241 (1975). See also
Justice Littlejohn's dissent in Fitzer.
20. Eiserhardt v. State Agric. & Mech. Soc'y., 235 S.C. 305, 311-12, 111 S.E.2d 568,
572 (1959).
21. Jeffcoat v. Caine, 261 S.C. 75, 80, 198 S.E.2d 258, 260 (1973).
3
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which have acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights.22
The decision in Fitzer merely deals the final blow to an already
antiquated doctrine.
23
Ronald A. Herring
B. Sovereign Immunity Retained
In Belue v. City of Spartanburg," the South Carolina Su-
preme Court held that a landowner could not sue a city for the
damage to his property and business caused by a broken water
main because his allegations of negligence and nuisance were re-
pugnant to the longstanding rule of sovereign immunity.25 The
court also held that the flooding of the landowner's property was
not a prohibited taking of private property for public use as con-
templated by the South Carolina Constitution." This ruling
keeps South Carolina in a small minority of states that have re-
fused to modify or abolish the doctrine of sovereign immunity
by judicial decision.
22. Brown v. Anderson County Hosp. Ass'n, 268 S.C. 479, 487, 234 S.E.2d 873, 876-
77 (1977). Subsequent to Brown, the legislature abolished the doctrine with regard to
hospitals, but limited recovery to a maximum of $100,000. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-50
(Supp. 1980).
23. Organizations that have relied on charitable immunity for protection in the past
should obtain adequate liability insurance and should consider incorporation to protect
individual members from liability. The unincorporated charitable institution is consid-
ered an unincorporated association and may be sued and proceeded against under the
name by which it is known. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-160 (1976). Process may be served on
any agent of the unincorporated association. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-330 (1976). If a judg-
ment against the unincorporated association results, "any property of the association and
the individual property of any copartner or member thereof found in the State shall be
liable to judgment and execution for satisfaction of any such judgment." S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-35-170 (1976). See also Elliott v. Greer Presb. Church, 181 S.C. 84, 186 S.E. 651
(1936); Hall v. Walters, 226 S.C. 430, 85 S.E.2d 729, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 953 (1955).
24. 276 S.C. 381, 280 S.E.2d 49 (1981).
25. Id. at 383, 280 S.E.2d at 49-50.
26. Id. at 383, 280 S.E.2d at 50.
27. For jurisdictions that have modified the traditional doctrine by judicial decision,
see Platt Bros. v. City of Waterbury, 72 Conn. 531, 45 A. 154 (1900); Mayor of Dalton v.
Wilson, 118 Ga. 100, 44 S.E. 830 (1903); Lundahl v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 338,
303 P.2d 667 (1956); Eastern Ill. State Normal School v. City of Charleston, 271 Ill. 602,
111 N.E. 573 (1916); Borell v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 133 La. 630, 63 So. 247
(1913); Higginson v. Treasurer of Boston, 212 Mass. 583, 99 N.E. 523 (1912); McLeod v.
City of Duluth, 174 Minn. 184, 218 N.W. 892 (1928); Hoy v. Capelli, 48 N.J. 81, 222 A.2d
649 (1966); Brown v. Board of Trustees 303 N.Y. 484, 104 N.E.2d 866 (1952); Memphis
Power and Light Co. v. City of Memphis, 172 Tenn. 346, 112 S.W.2d 817 (1937); Stock-
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A water main belonging to the City of Spartanburg burst
and flooded the plaintiff's property."s The plaintiff sued,29 claim-
ing that the city was liable for negligently maintaining the water
main, creating a public nuisance by installing and maintaining a
water main which burst, and taking the plaintiff's property for
public use without compensation.3 0 The city demurred on the
ground that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The trial judge sustained the demurrer
on the counts of negligence and nuisance because of the city's
sovereign immunity31 and ruled against the plaintiff's claim that
his property had been taken without compensation on the
grounds that the flooding was of a temporary nature.2 The
plaintiff appealed the trial judge's granting of the demurrer.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that section 5-7-70 of the
South Carolina Code, which waives a city's immunity to suit for
personal injury or property damage resulting from a "defect in
any street . . . or by reason of a defect or mismanagement of
anything under the control of the corporation within the limits
of any city or town. . ., waived defendant's immunity. The
South Carolina Supreme Court ruled, however, that because the
plaintiff's action was not based upon an actual defect in a street,
his action was not within the scope of section 5-7-70.3" The court
bridge v. State Highway Bd., 125 Vt. 366, 216 A.2d 44 (1965); Hewett v. City of Seattle,
62 Wash. 377, 113 P. 1084 (1911); Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 P. 710
(1925). For jurisdictions that have abolished sovereign immunity by judicial decision, see
Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969); Muskopf v. Corning
Hosp. Dist. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Evans v. County
Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971); Pittman v. City of Taylor, 398 Mich. 41, 247
N.W.2d 512 (1976); Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 235 N.W.2d 597 (1975); Jones v.
State Highway Comm'n., 593 S.W.2d 580 (Mo. App. 1979); Willis v. Department of Con-
serv. and Econ. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970); Thacker v. Board of Trustees of
Ohio State Univ., 35 Ohio St. 2d 49, 298 N.E.2d 542 (1973); Cords v. State, 62 Wis. 2d
42, 214 N.W.2d 405 (1974).
28. Record at 2-3.
29. Id. Plaintiff sought the return of $7,600 for the cost of repairing his parking lot,
cleaning and replacing carpeting in his store building, replacing damaged goods in his
photography shop, and for loss of business.
30. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 17 provides: "Private property shall not be taken for private
use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use without just compensation being
first made therefor."
31. Record at 7.
32. Id. at 7-8.
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-70 (1976).
34. 276 S.C. at 383, 280 S.E.2d at 50.
1982]
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also summarily rejected the plaintiff's claim that the bursting
water main constituted an actionable public nuisance.3 5 Finally,
the court, relying on Kline v. City of Columbia,3" ruled that by
failing to allege "a positive, affirmative, aggressive act on the
part of the municipality," the plaintiff had not shown that his
property was unconstitutionally taken.37 . On these grounds, the
supreme court upheld the demurrer granted by the trial judge3 s
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, neither a state39
nor a municipal subdivision of a state40 can be sued for its torts
in its own courts without its consent. Many states, however, dis-
tinguish between acts that are public and governmental in na-
ture and those that are private and proprietary, allowing tort
claims for the latter types of acts.41 The South Carolina Su-
preme Court has consistently refused to recognize this distinc-
tion42 and has indicated that suit against the state for a tortious
act or omission can be maintained only when (1) the legislature
has waived the state's immunity by statute;3 (2) the party nor-
mally entitled to immunity has maintained a nuisance;44 or (3)
there has been an unconstitutional taking of private property.45
Although the language of section 5-7-70 of the South Carolina
Code suggests a broad waiver of immunity for the negligent acts
of a municipality, South Carolina courts have narrowly con-
strued this section to allow recovery only for injuries caused by
an actual defect in a street.4 Belue typifies this restrictive ap-
35. Id.
36. 249 S.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 597 (1967).
37. 276 S.C. at 383, 280 S.E.2d at 50.
38. Id. at 384, 280 S.E.2d at 50.
39. Brooks v. One Motor Bus, 190 S.C. 379, 3 S.E.2d 42 (1939).
40. Abernathy v. City of Columbia, 213 S.C. 68, 48 S.E.2d 585 (1948).
41. See supra note 27. Judicial abrogation, however, is subject to partial or total
legislative reinstatement. See, e.g., Maule v. Conduit & Found. Corp., 124 N.J. Super.
488, 307 A.2d 651 (1973).
42. Boyce v. Lancaster County Natural Gas Auth., 266 S.C. 398, 223 S.E.2d 769
(1976).
43. Belton v. Richland Mem. Hosp., 263 S.C. 446, 211 S.E.2d 241 (1975).
44. Teague v. Cherokee County Mem. Hosp., 272 S.C. 403, 252 S.E.2d 296 (1979).
45. Kline v. City of Columbia, 249 S.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 597 (1967).
46. See, Dunn v. Barnwell, 43 S.C. 398, 21 S.E. 315 (1894). The court in Dunn held
that:
It is apparent from the title of this act, as well as from the terms used in the
body of the act, that the sole purpose was to give a person who had sustained
an injury by reason of a defect in a street, a right of action to recover damages
for such injury. The title of the act is as follows: "An act providing for a right
220 [Vol. 34
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proach to the statute. Similarly, the court's rejection in Belue of
the plaintiff's claim of public nuisance is in line with South Car-
olina precedent.47 Although the court recognized in Teague v.
Cherokee County Memorial Hospital that "there is authority for
the proposition that a governmental body, though otherwise im-
mune from liability, loses that immunity if the danger which
caused the harm is in fact a public nuisance, 48 it apparently has
been unwilling to utilize this approach.
The finding in Belue that the accident which caused the
plaintiff's loss was not an unconstitutional taking also appears to
be in accord with the past decisions of the South Carolina Su-
preme Court. The court normally will not find an unconstitu-
tional taking absent positive, affirmative, and aggressive state
action.49 To be affirmative and aggressive, the state action must
amount to an "actual interference with, or . . disturbance of,
property rights, resulting in injuries which are not merely conse-
quential or incidental. ' 50 Once a sovereign's actions have been
established as "aggressive," the court has been willing to take
the "broadest possible view of 'what is a taking' and has con-
strued the least actual 'damage' to be a 'taking.' "1
of action against a municipal corporation for damage sustained by reason of
defects in the repair of streets, sidewalks, and bridges within the limits of said
municipal corporation," and it is manifest that the purpose thus declared in
the title was adhered to in the body of the act ...
Id. at 401, 21 S.E. at 316 (emphasis in original). Accord, Hollifield v. Keller, 228 S.C. 584,
121 S.E.2d 213 (1961); Furr v. City of Rock Hill, 235 S.C. 44, 109 S.E.2d 697 (1959);
Hicks v. City of Columbia, 225 S.C. 553, 83 S.E.2d 199 (1954); Reeves v. City of Easley,
167 S.C. 231, 166 S.E. 120 (1932).
47. See, e.g., Kneece v. City of Columbia, 128 S.C. 375, 123 S.E. 100 (1924). The
plaintiff in Kneece was entitled to recovery because disagreeable odors from the defen-
dant's incinerator amounted to an unconstitutional taking of property. Although the
court did not specifically state this as the basis of its holding, it is clear from the author-
ity cited therein (Faust v. Richland County, 117 S.C. 251, 109 S.E. 151 (1921) and Der-
rick v. Columbia, 122 S.C. 29, 114 S.E. 857 (1922)) that the premise for granting relief
was that there was an unconstitutional taking. For references to this case, see Prosser,
Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 1006 n.87 (1966); Annot., 2
A.L.R.2d. 677, 683 (1948).
48. 272 S.C. 403, 405, 252 S.E.2d 296, 297 (1979).
49. See Kline v. City of Columbia, 249 S.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 597 (1967); Collins v.
City of Greenville, 233 S.C. 506, 105 S.E.2d 704 (1958).
50. Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 22, 8 S.E.2d 871, 874 (1940).
51. Kline v. City of Columbia, 249 S.C. at 537, 155 S.E.2d at 599. In Kline, the
defendant city pulled loose a gas pipe while widening a street and thereby caused an
explosion which damaged plaintiff's property. Because of the city's affirmative activity,
the court found an unconstitutional taking. See also Webb v. Greenwood County, 229
7
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In Belue, the South Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed its
alignment with a minority of jurisdictions that refuse to abro-
gate by judicial decision the doctrine of sovereign immunity. No-
tably, the dissent in Belue argued for the abolition of the doc-
trine, reasoning that to allow the sovereign "to commit
wrongdoing without any responsibility to its victims, while any
individual. . . would be called to task in court for such tortious
conduct"5 2 runs counter to the "basic concept underlying the
whole law of torts today that liability follows negligence. . ... 53
Indeed, the court might have easily mitigated the harshness of
the doctrine by construing section 5-7-70 of the South Carolina
Code according to its plain meaning rather than following its
traditional interpretation.
In light of Belue, it seems clear that legislative action will
be necessary to limit or abolish the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity in South Carolina. Until such action is taken, the only avail-
able means of circumventing the doctrine is through a narrowly
construed statutory waiver and the claim that there has been an
unconstitutional taking without compensation.
R. Lewis Johnson
II. CAUSATION-IN-FAcT--DES LAWSUITS
In Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Company," the District Court for
South Carolina rejected four theories proposed by a plaintiff
seeking to avoid being required to identify the specific defen-
dant manufacturer who caused her injury. The court held that
the plaintiff's inability to identify which defendant manufac-
tured the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) taken by her mother,55
S.C. 267, 92 S.E.2d 688 (1956) in which the South Carolina Supreme Court held:
South Carolina in its construction of Article I, § 17, Constitution of 1895, does
not recognize a distinction between "taking" and "damaging," but holds that a
deprivation of the ordinary beneficial use and enjoyment of one's property is
equivalent to the taking of it, and is as much a "taking" as though the prop-
erty were actually appropriated.
Id. at 282, 92 S.E.2d at 694.
52. - S.C. at -, 280 S.E.2d at 52 (quoting Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 20, 163 N.E.2d 89, 93 (1959)).
53. - S.C. at -, 280 S.E.2d at 52 (quoting Molitor, 18 IMI. 2d at 20, 163 N.E.2d at
93)).
54. 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
55. Diethylstilbestrol is a synthetic estrogen prescribed from 1947 through 1971 to
222 [Vol. 34
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or show an agreement between the defendant manufacturers as
to marketing, manufacturing, testing, or warning, was sufficient
to support granting of the defendants' motion for summary
judgment. The district court concluded that South Carolina
would not likely join the growing movement 6 toward modifying
causation-in-fact requirements where DES plaintiffs are
involved.
The facts in Ryan are nearly identical to hundreds of cases
brought by "DES daughters" nationwide. Between 1952 and
1953, the plaintiff's mother took DES during her pregnancy to
prevent a threatened miscarriage. The plaintiff later developed a
precancerous condition typical of prenatal exposure to the drug.
Because she could not identify the specific manufacturer of the
pills taken by her mother,57 the plaintiff was forced to sue eight
major producers of DES. 8
The district court initially found that because the plaintiff
could not identify the specific manufacturer, she had failed to
satisfy the threshold burden of showing cause-in-fact. 9 The
court also concluded that there was no civil conspiracy or "col-
lective efforts" by the drug manufacturers that would relieve the
plaintiff of her burden of linking her injuries to a particular
manufacturer.6"
The court in Ryan then reviewed and rejected each of the
four alternative theories of recovery advanced by the plaintiff:
prevent threatened miscarriages. In 1971, the FDA ordered use of DES discontinued
during pregnancy because female offspring developed vaginal adenosis (a precancerous
condition) and clear-cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina and uterus. See generally, Com-
ment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963
(1978)[hereinafter cited as FORDHAM Comment].
56. Payton v. Abbott Labs., 512 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mass. 1981); Gray v. United
States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607
P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Morrissy v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 76 Ill. App. 3d 753, 394 N.E.2d 1369 (1979); Thomas v. Ferndale Labs., 97
Mich. App. 718, 296 N.W.2d 160 (1980); Namm v. Charles E. Frost & Co., 178 N.J.
Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420
A.2d 1305 (1980); Lyons v. Premo Pharm. Labs, 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185
(1979); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981).
57. Mrs. Ryan could not remember markings, color, size, or shape of the pill.
Neither the doctor who prescribed the pills nor the drug store had any records which
specified the manufacturer. 514 F. Supp. at 1007.
58. One defendant was dismissed Feb. 20, 1980. Id. at n.2.
59. Id. at 1007.
60. Id. at 1008.
19821
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concert of action, alternative liability, enterprise liability, and
market share liability. Concert of action"1 was rejected because
there was no evidence of any agreement or common plan among
manufacturers not to adequately test or warn of known dan-
gers. 2 The court disallowed alternative liability 3 because all
suppliers of DES had not been joined as defendants.8 4 Enter-
prise liability was found 5 "repugnant to the most basic tenets of
tort law,"88 apparently based upon the court's belief that this
theory would make manufacturers insurers not only of their own
products, but any similar products. Lastly, the court dismissed
market share liability, 7 reasoning that it would be a "rejection
of over one hundred years of tort law which required . . . a
matching of defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury. ... 8
Because the plaintiff could not sustain the burden of proving
proximate cause without these theories, the court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Reaction in other jurisdictions to the theories rejected by
61. The theory of concert of action imposes joint and several liability on persons
who pursue, actively participate in, or encourage in any way a common plan to commit a
tortious injury. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 46 (4th ed. 1971), RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).
62. 514 F. Supp. at 1016. The district court refused to accept a parallel course of
action as evidence of such a plan.
63. Alternative liability holds those defendants who act negligently toward the
plaintiff and who fail to show that they did not cause the plaintiff's injury jointly and
severally liable for his injuries. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3)(1965).
64. 514 F. Supp. at 1016 (quoting comment h to § 433B(3), RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS (1965)).
65. The enterprise liability theory holds manufacturers of a generically similar prod-
uct who follow deficient industry-wide safety standards jointly and severally liable for
injuries caused by the product. See Hall v. E. L DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F.
Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), FORDHAM Comment, supra note 55 at 965; Note, Industry-
Wide Liability: Solving the Mystery of the Missing Manufacturer in Products Liability
Law, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 139 (1981).
66. 514 F. Supp. at 1017.
67. Id. at 1018. Market share liability holds each manufacturer liable based upon its
share of the market for the product. It is imposed when the plaintiff is unable to identify
a specific defendant and instead seeks to recover from those manufacturers whose output
constitutes a substantial share of the market. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588,
607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Note, A Rem-
edy for the "DES Daughters": Products Liability Without the Identification Require-
ment, 42 U. Pirr. L. REV. 669 (1981).
68. 514 F. Supp. at 1018, (quoting Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 616, 607
P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting)).
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the Ryan court has been inconsistent."' No court has accepted
enterprise liability. Only the California Supreme Court has rec-
ognized market share liability.70 That court considered the the-
ory a modification of alternative liability, since there was a sub-
stantial likelihood that the manufacturer was before the court.7
1
Two courts have acknowledged that application of the alterna-
tive liability theory to DES litigation was novel, but found sup-
port in traditional state law for the theory itself.72 Similarly,
only two courts have recognized the concert of action theory.
The New York Supreme Court found evidence "in abundance"
of conscious parallel activity by the drug companies from which
a "tacit understanding" may be inferred.7 3 However, at least five
courts other than Ryan have also rejected the theory.74 Perhaps
the reason for the inconsistent treatment of DES cases goes be-
yond the fact that the theories are novel expansions of tradi-
tional tort law. There also appears to be a remarkable difference
in the interpretation of substantially similar underlying facts. 5
The court in Ryan acknowledged that the same history had been
set forth in detail in other cases. 6 Yet while the New York court
found the evidence implicating the manufacturer to be over-
whelming,77 the Ryan court concluded that virtually the same
evidence proved "that no defendant entered into any agreement
or even cooperated with any other drug company in the licens-
ing, manufacturing, marketing, or promotion of stilbestrol for
69. 436 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
70. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). However, the court in Ferrigno used the concept to
determine allocation of liability among the defendants, 175 N.J. Super. at 573, 420 A.2d
at 1316.
71. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 144-45.
72. Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. at 565-67, 420 A.2d at 1312-13
(1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 77, 289 N.W.2d 20, 27 (1979).
73. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, -, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 633 (1981). The
Abel court also accepted this argument.
74. Payton v. Abbott Lab., 512 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mass. 1981); Sindell v. Abbott
Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980); Namm v. Charles E. Frost & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981); Fer-
rigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980); Lyons v. Premo
Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185 (1979).
75. Although there are factual differences in each case, the facts upon which this
issue turns are generally undisputed, see FORDHAM Comment, supra note 55, at 975-78.
76. 514 F. Supp. at 1008.
77. 79 A.D.2d at -, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
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the use that the plaintiff claims produced her injuries. '78 Recon-
ciliation of these differences seems impossible.
The Ryan court's treatment of statistics is even more puz-
zling. Some authorities assert that Lilly and five or six other
principal manufacturers produced over 90% of the DES mar-
ket.70 Expert testimony in one cdse put Lilly's market share at
45 %.80 However, the Ryan court stated that it was just as likely
that the actual manufacturer was absent when Lilly and seven
other major companies were in court.8' To reach this conclusion,
the court compared the eight defendants before it with the total
number of potential defendants, estimated at 118. If these eight
companies do, in fact comprise 90% of the market, however,
comparing eight with 118 is little more than a subtle manipula-
tion of figures, which could result in a substantial distortion of
truth.
A major concern of those courts that have accepted one of
the "novel" theories appears to be that an innocent plaintiff
should not be deprived of her cause of action merely because she
cannot identify the specific manufacturer who has caused her in-
jury, especially when the practices of all manufacturers have
substantially contributed to her inability to make such an iden-
tification.8 2 These courts have been willing to allow a limited ex-
pansion of established principles of tort liability where tradi-
tional evidentiary requirements seem insurmountable. The
primary concern of the courts that have rejected the same theo-
ries appears to be that such an expansion of traditional law will
make manufacturers liable, not only for their own, but for any
similar product.8 3 Some intermediate appellate courts84 and fed-
78. 514 F. Supp. at 1014.
79. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 55, at 977; Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at
612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
80. 79 A.D.2d at -, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 627 n.1.
81. 514 F. Supp. at 1007.
82. See FORDHAM Comment, supra note 55, at 993; Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79
A.D.2d at -, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 630; Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d
at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144; Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. at 568, 420 A.2d
at 1314.
83. E.g., Ryan v. Abbott Labs., 514 F. Supp. at 1017; Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal.
3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141; Namm v. Charles E. Frost & Co., 178
N.J. Super. at 33, 427 A.2d at 1128.
84. E.g., Namm v. Charles E. Frost & Co., 178 N.J. Super. at 34, 427 A.2d at 1128.
226 [Vol. 34
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eral courts85 have concluded that extensive shifts in the law
should be left to the higher courts or the legislature. Ryan
adopts the position that these shifts should not be made at all.
Patricia B. Kinard
III. ABROGATION OF THE LOCALITY RULE
Until recently, South Carolina courts folloved the so-called
"locality rule" that required plaintiffs to prove negligence in
medical malpractice cases by producing an expert who was com-
petent to testify that the defendant failed to exercise the degree
of skill typically exercised by other physicians practicing in the
same or similar localities.86 In King v. Williams,s7 the South
Carolina Supreme Court abrogated the locality rule and adopted
a standard of care not bound by geographical restrictions. The
court held that the degree of care to be observed is that of an
average, competent practitioner acting in the same or similar cir-
cumstances."8 Abrogation of the rule follows the modern trend.89
The defendant in King, a general practitioner, treated the
plaintiff's left foot, which had been injured in an automobile ac-
cident.90 The foot did not heal while in a cast or during the nine
months after the cast was removed. At the plaintiff's insistence,
the defendant referred him to orthopedic specialists who diag-
85. E.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs., 512 F. Supp. at 1040.
86. Before King, a member of the medical profession in South Carolina was bound
only to possess and exercise the degree of skill and learning that was "ordinarily pos-
sessed and exercised by members of his profession in good standing in the same general
neighborhood or in similar localities." Bessinger v. DeLoach, 230 S.C. 1, 7, 94 S.E.2d 3, 6
(1956) (referring to dentists)(emphasis added).
87. 276 S.C. 478, 279 S.E.2d 618 (1981).
88. Id. at 482, 279 S.E.2d at 620 (1981).
89. See Annot., 37 A.L.R. 3d 420, 426-30 (1971 & Supp. 1980); W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 164 (4th ed. 1971). Although the locality rule has apparently
been applied almost exclusively in the context of medical malpractice suits, at least one
court has employed the rule in a legal malpractice action. See Home v. Peckham, 97 Cal.
App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1978). Despite the South Carolina Supreme Court's
recent approval of attorney specialization in the fields of Estate Planning and Probate
Law, Taxation Law, and Family and Matrimonial Law, see S.C. Sup. CT. RULES, RULES
ON LAWYER COMPETENcE, RULE 3, South Carolina attorneys who perform professional ser-
vices in a specialized field without the aid of a specialist may, in light of King, be held to
a uniform, national standard of care.
90. The defendant physician first examined the foot at Loris Hospital the day fol-
lowing the accident. He x-rayed only the ankle region and diagnosed the injury as a
severe ankle sprain. 276 S.C. at 480, 279 S.E.2d at 619.
1982]
13
Johnson et al.: Torts
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
nosed a fracture-dislocation of the foot that required corrective
surgery.91 The plaintiff then initiated an action against the de-
fendant for his negligent diagnosis and treatment. The trial
judge, over the defendant's objections, ruled that a Florida phy-
sician was qualified to pass judgment on the degree of skill exer-
cised by the defendant.92 On appeal, the supreme court held
that, although the geographic proximity of a physician's practice
is one of various considerations, the traditional "locality rule"
has no present day vitality.
9 3
The court noted that the locality rule was based on the as-
sumption that a small town physician lacked not only the oppor-
tunity for learning and keeping abreast of advances in the pro-
fession, but also the ability to offer his patients the care and
treatment provided by modern medical facilities. It was there-
fore considered unfair to require that small town physicians be
held to the same standard of care as their better equipped urban
colleagues.9 4 The court in King observed, however, that the ad-
vance of required higher education, the wide dissemination of
medical information, and the increased access to adequate medi-
cal facilities have gradually eroded the logic of the locality rule.95
Furthermore, the practical difficulties inherent in finding local
physicians willing to testify on the plaintiff's behalP a and in al-
lowing a local standard of care below that which patients are
entitled to expect 97 led the court to discard the rule and adopt a
91. King suffered a 30% disability. Id.
92. Id. at 482, 279 S.E.2d at 619. Before King, it was necessary for a plaintiff to
obtain an expert who could testify that he was familiar with the standard of care in the
defendant's locality or similar localities. Annot. 37 A.L.R.3D 420, 423 (1971). Of course,
expert testimony is not required when the common knowledge or experience of laymen
enables them to infer causation and a lack of proper care. In King, the court noted that
affirmance of the verdict in that case was not dependent upon expert testimony; the jury
might reasonably have inferred that the plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by the
defendant's negligence. Id. at 483, 279 S.E.2d at 620.
93. 276 S.C. at 482, 279 S.E.2d at 620.
94. Id. at 481-82, 279 S.E.2d at 619.
95. Id. at 481, 279 S.E.2d at 620.
96. This reluctance has been referred to as the "conspiracy of silence." Comment,
Medical Malpractice-The "Locality Rule" and the "Conspiracy of Silence," 22 S.C.L.
R.v. 810, 817-20 (1970).
97. As the Washington Supreme Court observed in Pederson v. Dumouchel:
The fact that several careless practitioners might settle in the same place can-
not affect the standard of diligence and skill which local patients have a right
to expect. Negligence cannot be excused on the ground that others in the same
locality practice the same kind of negligence. No degree of antiquity can give
[Vol. 34
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standard set forth by the Washington Supreme Court in Peder-
son v. Doumouchel:98 "The degree of care which must be ob-
served is, of course, that of an average competent practitioner
acting in the same or similar circumstances. In other words, local
practice within geographic proximity is one, but not the only
factor to be considered."99 The locality rule was first articulated
over one hundred years ago by the Massachusetts Supreme
Court in Small v. Howard.100 The court in Small held that a
country surgeon was bound to exercise only that level of skill
possessed by other physicians and surgeons of ordinary ability
and skill practicing in the same locality in which he practiced. 10 1
Because of its narrowness, the "same locality" rule was sub-
ject to early attacks. 10 2 A number of courts held that the rule
was not applicable to specialists1 03 and others abrogated the rule
when uniform injuries required well known treatment.104 Some
courts liberalized the rule by finding the appropriate standard of
care to be that practiced by physicians in the general vicinity or
locality.10 5 Other courts broadened the rule even further by
holding a member of the medical profession to the standard ob-
served by members of his profession in good standing in either
the defendant's locality or a similar locality.10 6
sanction to usage bad in itself.
72 Wash. 2d 73, 78, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (1967).
98. 72 Wash.2d 73, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (1967).
99. Id. at 79, 431 P.2d at 978.
100. 128 Mass. 131 (1880).
101. Id. at 132. The court in Small used the language "similar locality" in formulat-
ing its rule but considered only the standard of care prevailing in the defendant's own
locality in applying the rule. The only states that have applied this strict rule in recent
years are Louisiana, Myer v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 225 La. 618, 73 So.2d 781
(1953); Samuels v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. La 1976) (applying
Louisiana law) and Nevada, Lockhart v. Maclean, 77 Nev. 210, 361 P.2d 670 (1961).
102. See, e.g., Viita v. Dolan, 132 Minn. 128, 135-37, 155 N.W. 1077, 1081 (1916).
103. E.g., Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1968);
Orcutt v. Miller, 95 Nev. 408, 595 P.2d 1191 (1979).
104. E.g., Naccarato v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970); Rucker v. High
Point Memorial Hosp., 285 N.C. 519, 206 S.E.2d 196 (1974).
105. E.g., Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 Conn. 552, 102 A.2d 352 (1954); Willard v. Nor-
cross, 86 Vt. 426, 85 A. 804 (1913).
106. E.g., Lewis v. Johnson, 12 Cal. 2d 558, 86 P.2d 99 (1939); Cavallaro v. Sharp, 84
R.I. 67, 121 A.2d 669 (1956). The South Carolina Supreme Court adopted this view in
Bessinger v. DeLoach, 230 S.C. 1, 94 S.E.2d 3 (1956). The REsTATEmNT adopted a posi-
tion similar to Bessinger but included trades as well as professions. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
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Applying the broader "similar locality" rule, however, also
proved problematic. Some courts held that whether a locality
was "similar" depended on the socioeconomic similarities be-
tween that locality and the defendant's. 10 7 Many courts, how-
ever, focused on the geographical proximities of the areas.108 In
Kapuschinsky v. United States,10 9 the South Carolina District
Court, interpreting the South Carolina locality rule, stated: "[I]t
would seem that the community is not necessarily restricted to
the geographical area in proximity to the alleged tortfeasor, but
would extend to other locales similarly situated."111
In 1968, the Massachusetts Supreme Court delivered the
most significant blow to the "locality rule" in Brune v.
Blinkof f. In Brune, the court completely overruled Small and
stated that "the medical profession should no longer be Balkan-
ized by . . . varying geographic standards in malpractice
cases. . . . The proper standard is whether the physician, if a
general practitioner, has exercised the degree of care and skill of
the average qualified practitioner, taking into account the ad-
vances in the profession."" 2
The South Carolina Supreme Court's abrogation of the lo-
cality rule in King follows the trend in other jurisdictions. Be-
cause the rule is no longer justified, its abrogation represents a
realistic and progressive step that will eliminate unwarranted
disparity in the standard of care to which physicians are held
and broaden the sources from which plaintiffs may seek expert
witnesses.
Ronald A. Herring
107. E.g., Sampson v. Veenboer, 252 Mich. 660, 234 N.W. 170 (1931).
108. See, e.g., Viita v. Dolan, 132 Minn. 128, 155 N.W. 1077 (1916); Sinez v. Owens,
33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949).
109. 248 F. Supp. 732 (D.S.C. 1966).
110. Id. at 743-44.
111. 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
112. Id. at 108, 235 N.E.2d at 798.
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IV. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
A. Cause of Action for Wrongful Birth in South
Carolina
In Phillips v. United States,113 the United States District
Court for South Carolina held that South Carolina law would
allow the parents of a child born with Down's syndrome"' 4 to sue
for wrongful birth.1 5 The district court also held that section
2680(h) of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)16 did not bar
the cause of action.111
The infant in Phillips was born with Down's syndrome at
Charleston Naval Regional Medical Center, where his mother
had been an outpatient throughout her pregnancy. Although
Mrs. Phillips had noted a positive family history of Down's syn-
drome on a prenatal questionnaire,"1 8 the attending physician
did not advise her of the possible risk to her offspring or recom-
mend genetic testing during the pregnancy.1 9 The Phillips
113. 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981).
114. Down's syndrome, commonly known as mongolism, is a syndrome of mental
retardation associated with physical abnormalities which include retarded growth, lax-
ness of joint ligaments, and broad hands and feet. 508 F. Supp. at 546 n.4 (quoting
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1382 (4th unabr. lawyer's ed. W. Dornette 1976)).
115. 508 F. Supp. at 551-552. A wrongful birth claim is a parental action alleging
that the physician's failure to advise them of the possibility of birth defects in their
offspring precluded an informed decision to terminate the pregnancy. Phillips v. United
States, No. 79-551-8,7 & 16 (D.S.C. Dec. 7, 1981)(Subsequent case in which the court
addressed the doctor's liability for wrongful birth.) In a companion case, Phillips v.
United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1981), discussed at 33 S.C.L. REV. 170 (1981),
the court denied the infant plaintiff's claim for wrongful life arising from the same cause
of action, holding that there is no cause of action for wrongful life in South Carolina. For
a discussion of the distinctions between wrongful life and wrongful birth claims, see Rog-
ers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and
Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713 (1982).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)(1976).
117. 508 F. Supp. at 548.
118. Approximately three to five per cent of all cases of Down's syndrome are
caused by inheritance of an abnormal chromosome 14. No. 79-551-8 at 8. A positive fam-
ily history of Down's syndrome indicates the risk of this type of inheritable Down's syn-
drome in future offspring. Id. at 9.
119. Blood karotyping can be performed on the potential mother and the afflicted
family member to determine if the Down's syndrome at issue is inheritable. Id. at 9.
Amniocentesis, a minimal risk prenatal testing procedure, is used to detect Down's syn-
drome in a fetus. Id. Both of these testing procedures were available at the time of Mrs.
Phillips' pregnancy. Id. at 10 & 15.
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brought an action against the United States alleging that the
doctor's failure to advise, counsel and test Mrs. Phillips consti-
tuted a breach of his duty as a physician.12 0 The defendant
moved for summary judgment, claiming that the misrepresenta-
tion exception to the FTCA'21 barred the action and that wrong-
ful birth was not recognized as a valid cause of action in South
Carolina.
122
The court first examined the defendant's contention that
the claim was barred by the misrepresentation exclusion of the
FTCA, and found that the provision was limited to "the tradi-
tional and commonly understood legal definition of 'negligent
misrepresentation.' ,,12' Examining the application of the exclu-
sion in the context of medical malpractice,124 the court noted
two lines of authority: the view that the misrepresentation ex-
clusion never applies to a claim of medical malpractice 125 and
another view that in limited situations, the section will apply.
26
Adopting the second position, the court concluded that in most
medical situations there is a duty not only to inform a patient of
his condition, but an additional duty to render proper care and
treatment for that condition.127 Reading the complaint in Phil-
lips to allege "a failure to properly advise, counsel, and test Mrs.
Phillips with respect to certain genetic risks," the court held
that the claim was not precluded by section 2680(h). 28
The court also examined the defendant's contention that
wrongful birth was not a claim upon which relief could be
120. The plaintiffs claimed the defendant should have administered an amni-
ocentesis test by which a doctor could determine whether the fetus would be born with
Down's syndrome. 508 F. Supp. at 547 n.5.
121. Section 2680 of the FTCA states, in pertinent part: "The provisions of this
chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to... (h) Any claim arising out
of ... misrepresentation. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)(1976).
122. Under the FTCA, the district court must follow "the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1976).
123. 508 F. Supp. at 547 (quoting United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 706, the
only opinion in which the Supreme Court has interpreted the misrepresentation exclu-
sion of the FTCA).
124. 508 F. Supp. at 547.
125. Ramirez v. United States, 567 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1977).
126. Herring v. Knabb, 458 F. Supp. 359 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
127. 508 F. Supp. at 548, (quoting 2 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
260.05[3][c](Matthew Bender 1980)).
128. 508 F. Supp. at 548.
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granted.12 The district court considered decisions from other ju-
risdictions1 30 that have confronted similar claims, and found
that "the overwhelming majority of the more recent cases" rec-
ognized the validity of the cause of action."1 Analyzing argu-
ments against such a recognition, the court determined that the
difficulty in calculating damages was no bar, since any benefits
the plaintiffs received from the child's birth could be offset
against the detriments that flowed from the defendant's alleged
negligence. 13 2 The court also rejected the policy disfavoring
abortions as having dubious merit in light of Roe v. Wade3"3 and
subsequent cases recognizing abortion as a qualified right.13"
Reasoning that the more important policy was against shielding
wrongdoers from liability for their negligent acts, " 5 the court
perceived the plaintiffs' complaint to assert a traditional claim
of common-law negligence, and not a new cause of action."' As
support for this conclusion, the district court pointed to the
South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Baldwin v. Sand-
ers,13 7 which affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant a demur-
rer in a "wrongful pregnancy" case. ss
The district court's reasoning in Phillips comports with the
analysis of a growing number of both federal and state courts
considering similar issues. With only one exception,"'39 the appli-
cation of the misrepresentation exclusion has been held to de-
pend upon whether a complaint alleges failure to properly treat
a patient or merely a failure to adequately inform him of his
condition."1 0 The plaintiff's claim that the doctor negligently
129. Id. Since there was no controlling decision, the district court was obligated to
"predict the determination that the state supreme court would reach on the question."
Id. See supra note 122.
130. E.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d
401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.
1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
131. 508 F. Supp. at 549.
132. Id. at 549-550, (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 920 (1977)).
133. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
134. 508 F. Supp. at 550.
135. Id. at 550-551.
136. Id.
137. 266 S.C. 394, 223 S.E.2d 602 (1976).
138. 508 F. Supp. at 551-552.
139. 567 F.2d 854.
140. E.g., Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Beech v. United
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failed to perform the amniocentesis test clearly meets this
criteria.
Similarly, other jurisdictions recognizing a claim of wrongful
birth have generally dismissed policy arguments against it, and
viewed the issue as one of common-law negligence rather than a
completely novel cause of action."" Such an approach is consis-
tent with the traditional ability of the judiciary to resolve con-
temporary problems through conventional tort principles. Be-
cause the Phillips court could only predict the conclusion that
the South Carolina Supreme Court would reach if confronted
with an identical issue, the fate of such claims in the state courts
is still uncertain. The South Carolina court's refusal to dismiss
the wrongful pregnancy claim in Baldwin however, suggests the
likelihood of a similar result.
14 2
R. Lewis Johnson
B. Liability for Wrongful Birth in South Carolina
In a subsequent decision, Phillips v. United States,43 the
District Court of South Carolina addressed the issue of liability
in the Phillips' wrongful birth claim. As required by the Federal
Tort Claims Act,144 the district court sought to determine and
apply the substantive law of South Carolina. The court found
the defendant liable for breach of the applicable standard of ob-
stetrical care14 5 but set aside the issue of damages for future
resolution.
The district court found that the defendant had deviated
States, 345 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1965); Herring v. Knabb, 458 F. Supp. 359 (S.D. Ohio
1978); Diaz Castro v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 959 (D. Puerto Rico 1978); Green v.
United States, 385 F. Supp. 641 (S.D. Cal. 1974).
141. E.g., Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 420, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 372
(Tex. 1975).
142. Baldwin v. Sanders, 266 S.C. 394, 223 S.E.2d 602 (1976).
143. No. 79-551-8 (D.S.C. Dec. 7, 1981).
144. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680
(1976 & Supp. 1981).
145. The court also found the defendant liable in the infant plaintiff's claim for
neonatal medical malpractice arising from misdiagnosis of a cardiac defect which the
infant exhibited at birth. No 79-551-8 at 27. The defendant's failure to refer the infant
to a cardiac specialist when medically indicated was held to be a breach of the applicable
standard of pediatric care. Id. at 26.
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from the applicable standard of obstetrical care" 6 by failing to
provide adequate genetic counseling and prenatal testing when
informed of Mrs. Phillips' positive family history for Down's
syndrome. 14 7 This breach of duty precluded an informed paren-
tal decision to terminate the pregnancy 4" and thereby proxi-
mately caused the birth of a severely afflicted child.1 49 The court
did not decide the proper measure of damages, but noted that
other courts have allowed compensation for pecuniary loss' 50
and emotional anguish."'
The court based its analysis on the premise that the wrong-
.ful birth claim stated a cause of action "sounding in negligence
or medical malpractice.' 52 Because of the lack of precedent in
South Carolina law,'5 3 the district court relied on its own deci-
sion in the first Phillips case' 5' to establish wrongful birth as a
viable cause of action supported by both the trend of author-
ity85' and policy considerations. Most persuasive to the court
was society's interest "in insuring that genetic testing is properly
146. The court noted South Carolina's rejection of the "locality rule" in King v.
Williams, 276 S.C. 478, 279 S.E.2d 618 (1981), and asserted alternatively that the attend-
ing physician's status as a resident specialist would subject the defendant to a national
standard of care. No. 79-551-8 at 25. The court accorded greater weight to the expert
testimony within that specialty in establishing the standard of care to be implied. Id. at
26.
147. See supra notes 118 & 119.
148. Both parents testified that they would have elected to abort the fetus had they
known that it would be born with Down's syndrome. Id. at 7. The court considered this
testimony to be determinative of the parents' subjective intent, Id. at 8, and also noted
the fact that Mrs. Phillips later underwent surgery in order to avoid conception of an-
other afflicted child. Id. at 7.
149. No. 79-551-8 at 16.
150. Id. at 27. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); Jacobs
v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
151. No. 79-551-8 at 27-28. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8
(1979).
152. No. 79-551-8 at 23.
153. The Federal Tort Claims Act requires that the district court follow "the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1976). The court
asserted that "in the absence of controlling precedents the court must attempt to predict
the determination that the state supreme court would reach if confronted with the ques-
tion." No. 79-551-8 at 22 (citing Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269 (3d Cir. 1974);
Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964)).
154. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981)(denying defendant's
motion for summary judgment and recognizing wrongful birth as a viable cause of
action).
155. No. 79-551-8 at 22. See supra cases cited in notes 140 & 141.
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performed and interpreted."""6
Denise Antoine
V. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Until recently, a showing of some bodily injury caused by a
tortfeasor's conduct was a necessary element of all tort actions
brought in South Carolina. In Ford v. Hutson, 57 however, the
South Carolina Supreme Court expressly recognized intentional
infliction of emotional distress as an independent cause of ac-
tion. The court adopted Section 46 of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS' 5 s and held that severe emotional distress, caused
intentionally or recklessly by extreme and outrageous conduct, is
compensable whether or not bodily harm results. 5 ' South Caro-
lina thus joins a growing number of states that have acknowl-
edged the existence of this tort.l60
In 1971, the defendant purchased a new house from the
plaintiff real estate broker. A number of serious construction de-
fects in the house later became apparent. 61 On several occasions
over a period of two years, the defendant rudely and profanely
156. No. 79-551-8 at 23 (quoting Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F.
Supp. 692, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1978)).
157. 276 S.C. 157, 276 S.E.2d 776 (1981).
158. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). Subsection (1) states: "One who
by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm
to the other results from it, for such bodily harm."
159. 276 S.C. at 162, 276 S.E.2d at 778.
160. See, e.g., Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954); Wilson v. Wilkins,
181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W.2d 428 (1930); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.
2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950); Delta Fin.
Co. v. Ganakas, 93 Ga. App. 297, 91 S.E.2d 383 (1956); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, 104
Ind. App. 576, 12 N.E.2d 360 (1938); Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242
N.W. 25 (1932); Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920); Agis v. Howard
Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 340, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976); La Salle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty,
126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934); Halio v. Lurie, 15 A.D.2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759
(1961); Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 189 Okla. 60, 113 P.2d 190 (1941); Samms v.
Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961); Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210
S.E.2d 145 (1974); Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963). See generally
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV.
1033 (1936); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MiCH.
L. REV. 874 (1939); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100 (1959).
161. Among the defects were a rotting rear deck, sagging roof line, and faulty air
conditioning. 276 S.C. at 163, 276 S.E.2d at 779.
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confronted the plaintiff in public places and at social gatherings
with demands that the necessary repairs be made.16 2 The defen-
dant allegedly entered the plaintiff's home without knocking on
at least two occasions and shouted at her in the presence of her
guests.1 1 3 Upset by these confrontations, the plaintiff exper-
ienced physical and emotional problems, was eventually hospi-
talized, and was diagnosed to be suffering from depression. The
plaintiff brought an action against the defendant in which she
alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress; at trial judg-
ment was entered for the plaintiff. The supreme court, in af-
firming the judgment, expressly acknowledged what recent
South Carolina cases""" have suggested-that intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress is an independent cause of action.
The supreme court reasoned that since it had already im-
pliedly accepted intentional infliction of emotional distress as an
actionable tort and had quoted section 46 of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS to support a recent decision,6 5 the time had
come to expressly confirm its acceptance of the RESTATEMENT'S
rule of liability.'66 The court, citing a recent decision by the
Maine Supreme Court, 67 indicated that four elements must be
established to maintain a successful action for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.168 First, the defendant must have in-
flicted severe emotional distress intentionally or recklessly' 6 or
have been substantially certain that such distress would re-
sult.'70 Second, the defendant's conduct must have been "ex-
treme and outrageous" beyond "all possible bounds of decency"
and of a kind that is "atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civi-
162. Record, vol. 1, at 60-64, 68; vol. 3, at 425-28.
163. 276 S.C. at 163, 276 S.E.2d at 779.
164. E.g., Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. 766, 259 S.E.2d 812 (1979); Bel-
lamy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 269 S.C. 578, 239 S.E.2d 73 (1977); Rhodes v.
Security Fin. Corp., 268 S.C. 300, 233 S.E.2d 105 (1977); Turner v. ABC Jalousie Co., 251
S.C. 92, 160 S.E.2d 528 (1968).
165. Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. at 770, 259 S.E.2d at 814 (1979).
166. 276 S.C. at 162, 276 S.E.2d at 778.
167. 401 A.2d 148 (Me. 1979).
168. Id. at 154.
169. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS § 46, Comment i (1965)). The RE-
STATEMENT defines "recklessly" as acting "in deliberate disregard of a high degree of
probability that the emotional distress will follow." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §
46, Comment i, (1965).
170. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment i).
1982]
23
Johnson et al.: Torts
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
lized community."171 Third, the plaintiff's emotional distress
must have been caused by the defendant's actions. Finally, the
emotional distress must have been "severe, '17 2 although physical
manifestations of distress need not be present. The court ob-
served that while a business relationship such as that in Ford
may in some cases provide an excuse for otherwise actionable
behavior, the relationship is normally only one consideration in
determining whether conduct meets the extreme and outrageous
standard. The court also ruled that because the plaintiff's claim
was based on a new tort that does not depend on traditional
torts such as assault or slander for its existence, it was subject to
South Carolina's six-year statute of limitations,17 3 rather than
the two-year statute.
1 74
Although in recent decisions the supreme court had indi-
cated a willingness to recognize intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress as an independent tort, those cases also seemed to
suggest that a showing of some physical manifestation of injury
was necessary to satisfy the requirement that the emotional dis-
tress be "severe." 1 5 In Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distribut-
ing Co.,17 6 for example, the court discarded the requirement of
physical impact, but required a showing of bodily injury to sup-
port an award of damages for emotional distress. The plaintiff in
Padgett was awarded damages based on a showing that the
shock and emotional upset caused by the defendant's conduct
precipitated a severe skin ailment. Subsequently, in Turner v.
ABC Jalousie Co., 1 77 the court found a complaint sufficient to
avoid a demurrer simply because it alleged that the defendant's
tortious conduct had caused physical or bodily injury to the
plaintiff. Similarly, in Bellamy v. General Motors Acceptance
171. Id, (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Commend d).
172. Id. The RESTATEMENT defines "severe emotional distress" as such "that no rea-
sonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and the duration of the dis-
tress are factors to be considered in determining its severity." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46, Comment j (1965).
173. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530(5) (Supp. 1980).
174. 276 S.C. at 167, 276 S.E.2d at 781.
175. Judge Chapman, in Whitten v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 468 F. Supp. 470
(S.C.D.C. 1970), af'd 594 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1979), was "convinced ... that an allegation
of bodily injury or illness must be made before the courts of the State of South Carolina
would allow a plaintiff recovery for the infliction of emotional distress." Id. at 479.
176. 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E.2d 265 (1958).
177. 251 S.C. 92, 160 S.E.2d 528 (1968).
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Corp.,1 78 the plaintiff was only required to show that he had suf-
fered visible physical distress and was hospitalized as a result of
the defendant's conduct. In Rhodes v. Security Finance
Corp.,179 however, the court denied recovery based on the plain-
tiff's failure to show physical harm.
Thus, before Ford, the law in South Carolina had evolved to
require only a minimal showing of bodily injury to sustain
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ford is the
first decision in which the court has expressly declared that no
showing of bodily harm is necessary for recovery. Indeed, the
court in Ford declared the plaintiff's evidence of illness and hos-
pitalization18 ° nonessential, but noted that when evidence of
bodily injury is lacking, the defendant's conduct must be more
extreme and outrageous in order to assure that the mental dis-
turbance is genuine and that it meets the severity standard.1 81
Ford clarifies and refines the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and brings South Carolina into line with the
majority of other jurisdictions. Several aspects of this newly
adopted tort, however, remain unclear. Just how shocking be-
havior must be before South Carolina courts will impose liability
in the absence of bodily injury remains to be seen.1 82 Moreover,
although Ford settles the law pertaining to emotional distress
suffered by the object of the tortfeasor's conduct, it leaves unad-
dressed the issue of emotional distress suffered by a bystander
who witnesses conduct directed at a third party. 83
Laura Callaway Hart
178. 269 S.C. 578, 239 S.E.2d 73 (1977).
179. 268 S.C. 300, 233 S.E.2d 105 (1977).
180. 276 S.C. at 165-66, 276 S.E.2d at 780.
181. This requirement follows the reasoning of the RESTATEMENT: "Severe distress
must be proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defen-
dant's conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment j (1965). Also, "if the enormity of the outrage
carries conviction that there has in fact been severe emotional distress, bodily harm is
not required." Id. Comment k.
182. See Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau, 276 S.C. 284, 278 S.E.2d 607 (1981)
in which the supreme court, citing Ford, held sufficient to support a cause of action a
complaint alleging that plaintiff "suffered from extreme emotional distress, nervousness,
worry, loss of sleep, headaches ... all to his damage. . . ." Id. at 289, 278 S.E.2d at 609.
The court was careful, however, to note that this conclusion "intimate[s] no opinion as to
the ultimate viability of the plaintiff's claim." Id.
183. The court in Ford adopted only subsection (1) of section 46 of the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. Subsection (2) pertains to the emotional distress of bystander
1982]
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VI. TERMINATION OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
The South Carolina Supreme Court may have taken a step
toward recognizing a tort for bad faith termination of an at-will
employment contract in Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Co." 4 In a decision concerning pretrial mat-
ters only, the court failed to follow a line of South Carolina cases
that had upheld the granting of demurrers in cases of at-will em-
ployment contracts pursuant to the general, common-law rule
that at-will employment contracts may be terminated for any
reason or for no reason at all.
85
The plaintiff in Todd was fired from his job as an agent for
defendant insurance companies after an investigation of sus-
picious fire loss claims and of the plaintiff's possible connection
with an arsonist. As part of the investigation, the plaintiff was
subjected to a voice stress analysis, which was apparently con-
ducted in a manner that violated South Carolina's polygraph
laws.18 6 In a suit against his former employers and the investiga-
tor, the plaintiff alleged bad faith termination of his employ-
ment contract. The defendant insurance companies demurred on
the ground that South Carolina did not recognize a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful termination of an employment contract which
is terminable at will. 8 7 The trial judge overruled the demurrer
on the ground that the defendants' alleged violation of the pub-
lic policy embodied in the polygraph laws took the case beyond
the simple at-will employment contract issue.'88
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that because the defendants'
conduct was so aggravated, the general rule that at-will con-
tracts may be terminated by either party for any reason or no
reason at all should not apply, and asked the court to recognize
the so-called "public policy exception."' 8 The most conservative
witnesses to tortious conduct.
184. 276 S.C. 284, 278 S.E.2d 607 (1981).
185. See, e.g., Ross v. Life Ins. Co., 273 S.C. 764, 259 S.E.2d 814 (1979); Gainey v.
Coker's Pedigreed Seed Co., 227 S.C. 200, 87 S.E.2d 486 (1955); Shealey v. Fowler, 182
S.C. 81, 188 S.E.499 (1936); Annot., 62 A.L.R.3D 271 (1975).
186. Brief for Respondent at 9, Brief for Appellant Equifax at 8. South Carolina's
polygraph laws are codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-53-10 to -250 (1976).
187. Record at 30.
188. Id.
189. Brief for Respondent at 7-8. The public policy exception was established by the
landmark decision of Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal.
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form of this exception limits an employer's right to discharge
when the discharge would violate public policy embodied in a
state statute.190 The plaintiff reasoned that because his allega-
tions, if proven true, might subject the defendants to criminal
sanctions, the defendants had clearly violated a public policy of
the state.19 The plaintiff also cited a Fourth Circuit case, de-
Treville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 92 for the proposition that
South Carolina does not inflexibly follow the general rule.193 The
court in deTreville stated that in South Carolina termination in
a manner that is "contrary to equity and good conscience" may
be an actionable wrong.
19 4
Although in 1979 the South Carolina Supreme Court in
Ross v. Life Insurance Co.195 had reaffirmed the general rule
that termination of at-will employment contract is not actiona-
ble, the court in Todd distinguished Ross on the ground that
because the plaintiff in Ross had conceded that his employment
contract was terminable at will, demurrer was warranted; the
App. 3d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). The harsh operation of the general rule on terminability
of at-will employment contracts has led to the call for modification of the rule. See gen-
erally Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Peck, Unjust Discharges
From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIo ST. L. J. 1 (1979); Note,
Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate
Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. Rav. 1816 (1980).
Although Petermann was a contract action, some courts have recognized an action
in tort for wrongful termination of at-will employment contracts. See Jackson v. Mini-
doka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 I1.
2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297
N.E.2d 425 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976);
Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or.
210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975), Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 386
A.2d 119 (1978); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). Tort liability
is based on establishing a duty on the part of the employer not to engage in conduct
toward the employee that contravenes some important public policy.
190. See supra note 189, at 1822-23.
191. Brief for Respondent at 7-8.
192. 439 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1971).
193. The trial court in Ross v. Life Ins. Co., 273 S.C. 764, 259 S.E.2d 814 (1979),
concluded that the rule in deTreville is limited to commercial settings such as franchises,
as in deTreville, and manufacturer distributor relationships. Record at 15, Ross. The
trial court in Todd, however, regarded deTreville as broader in scope and concluded that
"[w]hether the principles enunciated in deTreville should apply to the type of malicious
and aggravated behavior allegedly committed by the defendants is an important question
not answered by the court in Ross." Record at 31, Todd.
194. 439 F.2d at 1100.
195. 273 S.C. at 765, 259 S.E.2d at 815.
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plaintiff in Todd, however, did not mention in his complaint
that his was an at-will contract."' 6 Because a "demurrer attacks
the four corners of the pleading only," the court concluded that
the complaint in Todd was not demurrable. 197 However, the
complaint in Ross did not mention the nature of the plaintiff's
employment contract either. In Ross, the parties stipulated at
the demurrer hearing that the contract was terminable at will; in
Todd, the issue was raised in the defendants' answer.""" Thus,
the distinction drawn by the court appears to be tenuous. Ross
was not, however, based on allegations that the defendant, in
terminating the employment contract, acted in an "unconsciona-
ble or inequitable manner or for unconscionable or inequitable
reasons,'"199 and apparently the defendant had not violated a
state statute or recognized public policy.
Since the public policy exception to the general rule on ter-
minability of at-will contracts was first recognized in the
landmark case of Petermann v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,00 the exception has been recognized in at least
twelve other jurisdictions,201 and at least two federal judges, in-
cluding Judge Haynsworth, have noted this trend.20 2 Apparently
only Florida, Alabama, and the District of Columbia have ex-
pressly refused to recognize the public policy exception.203 In
view of the trend toward mitigating the harsh general rule and
the call for the South Carolina Supreme Court to recognize -the
196. 276 S.C. at 290-91, 278 S.E.2d at 610.
197. Id. at 290, 278 S.E.2d at 610.
198. Id. at 290, 278 S.E.2d at 609.
199. Record at 15, Todd.
200. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
201. Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); Kelsay
v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas
Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Scrogan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky.
1977); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977);
Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Monge v. Beebe Rub-
ber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417
A.2d 505 (1980); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler &
Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270
(W. Va. 1978).
202. deTreville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099, 1100 (4th Cir. 1971);
Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 825 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
203. Hinricks v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1979); Ivy v. Army Times
Publishing Co., 482 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981); Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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public policy exception, 04 the court's failure to end the argu-
ment in Todd at the demurrer stage appears to indicate at least
a willingness to consider the question. Perhaps the outrageous
conduct of the employer, or the violation of statutory law, or a
combination of the two, convinced the court that the time has
come to recognize an exception to the general rule that it had
affirmed in Ross.
Patricia B. Kinard
VII. STRICT LIABILITY IN SERVICE TRANSACTIONS
In DeLoach v. Whitney,205 the South Carolina Supreme
Court declined to extend the doctrine of strict liability in tort to
include the negligent installation of a nondefective product. This
decision places South Carolina in line with the majority of juris-
dictions that have considered whether pure service transac-
tions °0 should be subject to strict tort liability.207
Plaintiff DeLoach won four new tires from the defendant's
tire company and had them mounted on his vehicle at the de-
fendant's place of business. One of the defendant's employees
failed to replace a deteriorated valve stem on the right front tire.
The valve stem was not a part of the new tire and was not sup-
204. Contracts, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 32 S.C.L. REv. 54, 67 (1980).
205. 275 S.C. 543, 273 S.E.2d 768 (1981).
206. Pure service refers to those service transactions in which the service is of prime
importance and the product is incidental. See generally, Henderson, Extending the
Boundaries of Strict Products Liability: Implications of the Theory of the Second Best,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 1036, 1047-50 (1980); Sales, The Service-Sales Transaction: A Citadel
under Assault, 10 ST. MARY's L.J. 13 (1978); Note, Application of Strict Liability to
Repairers: A Proposal for Legislative Action in the Face of Judicial Inaction, 8 PAc.
L. J. 865 (1977); Comment, Sales-Service Hybrid Transactions: A Policy Approach, 28
Sw. L. J. 575 (1974).
207. See, e.g., Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, 604 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.
1979)(no strict liability for failure to warn of defects not created by servicer, applying
Mississippi law); Raritan Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander, Inc., 458 F.2d 1106 (3d
Cir. 1972)(service of airplane landing gear, applying New Jersey law); Lemley v. J & B
Tire Co., 426 F. Supp. 1378 (W.D. Pa. 1977)(installation of brake shoes); Swenson
Trucking & Excavating, Inc. v. Truckweld Equip. Co., 604 P.2d 1113 (Alaska 1980)(fail-
ure of repairer to discover faulty weld); Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32,
539 P.2d 584 (1975)(repair work on airplane); Nickel v. Hyster Co., 97 Misc. 2d 770, 412
N.Y.S.2d 273 (Sup. Ct. 1978)(repair of forklift). But see Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973)(strict liability applicable to mechanical and ad-
ministrative hospital services).
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plied by the defendant. °s Six weeks later, the plaintiff was se-
verely injured when the rupture of the valve stem caused him to
lose control of his car. The plaintiff instituted an action against
the owner of the company sounding in strict liability in tort20 9
and the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground
that no sale of a product had occurred. The trial judge, denying
the defendant's motion, construed South Carolina's strict liabil-
ity statute to cover the sale of services. 10 Although the jury re-
turned a verdict for the defendant, the lower court granted the
plaintiff a new trial on other grounds. 211 The defendant appealed
the trial judge's denial of its motion for a directed verdict on the
issue of strict liability.
The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the defen-
dant's motion for a directed verdict should have been granted as
a matter of law and held that strict liability does not apply to a
service transaction in which no defective product is supplied or
used.212 The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
complete tire assembly, consisting of the tire, rim, and valve
stem, should be recognized as a product for the purpose of im-
208. Record at 2.
209. The plaintiff also brought and subsequently dropped causes of action in breach
of warranty and negligence. The warranty action was dropped because the defendant had
not sold the deteriorated valve stem. The record does not show why the negligence action
was dropped.
210. Record at 39-40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (1976) provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) shall apply although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Section 15-73-20 of the South Carolina Code recognizes assumption of risk as a defense
against strict liability, and § 15-73-30 incorporates the comments to 402A as legislative
intent. For a discussion of the statute and its application, see Montgomery & Owen,
Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective
Products, 27 S.C.L. REv. 803 (1976).
211. The trial judge granted a new trial based on the conduct of the plaintiff's attor-
ney in his closing argument to the jury. Record at 103.
212. 275 S.C. at 545-46, 273 S.E.2d at 769-70.
30
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 15
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss1/15
1982] TORTS
posing strict products liability.2 1 3
The court relied on Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co.
214
in which a plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident ap-
proximately three weeks after the defendant department store
mounted a new tire on the plaintiff's car. The accident was pur-
portedly caused by the installer's failure to tighten the lug nuts
holding the tire to the hub.21 5 The plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendant had supplied a defective "product" in its failure to
properly mount the tire on her automobile and that the defen-
dant should have been held strictly liable.216 The Oregon Su-
preme Court, however, reasoned that the store had not actually
supplied a defective product and refused to extend strict liabil-
ity to the installation.
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court arrived at es-
sentially the same holding as the Oregon Court, DeLoach is a
more compelling case for the application of strict liability. In
Hoover there was no product, only alleged human error. In
DeLoach, however, the tire assembly, of which the deteriorated
valve stem was an integral part, arguably was a "product" sold
by the defendant. Moreover, policies underlying the doctrine of
strict liability2"' are relevant to the facts in DeLoach. Not only
213. See Brief for Respondent at 22. The definition of "product" has expanded con-
siderably since the incorporation of strict liability into the RSTATEENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS. From the inclusion of only food and products for intimate bodily use, "product"
now extends to automobiles, furniture, and even packaging and containers. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comments d, h (1966). The South Carolina Supreme Court
characterized the sale of a house as a sale of a product in Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co.,
267 S.C. 497, 501, 229 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1976).
214. 270 Or. 498, 528 P.2d 76 (1974).
215. The cause of the accident was disputed. The defendant contended that the
plaintiff failed to control her vehicle while passing another car. Id. at 499, 528 P.2d at 76.
216. Id. at 499-503, 528 P.2d at 77. The plaintiff also brought a cause of action in
negligence. The jury, however, found for the defendant on this issue. Id. at 499-500, 528
P.2d at 76-77.
217. The generally accepted policies are as follows:
(1) Sellers are in a better position to identify risks and take action to reduce
those risks;
(2) Sellers can better absorb and spread the costs of accidents;
(3) Through advertising, the manufacturer-seller induces the public to rely on
its expertise and skill.
Montgomery & Owen, supra note 210, at 809-10. See generally Henderson, supra note
206, at 1039-42; Reynolds, Strict Liability for Commercial Services-Will Another Cita-
del Crumble?, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 298 (1977); Note, supra note 206, at 873-74; Comment,
supra note 206, at 583-89.
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was the defendant in a better position than the plaintiff to dis-
cover and replace the faulty valve stem, but it was also better
able to allocate the risk by obtaining insurance against the loss.
Most importantly, the plaintiff relied on the reputation of the
defendant's business and on the skill and expertise of his em-
ployees. Despite these strong policy considerations, the South
Carolina Supreme Court declined to find the defendant in
DeLoach liable.
Although courts have been reluctant to extend strict liabil-
ity to pure service transactions, some have applied the doctrine
to sale-service hybrid transactions. 218 In the typical hybrid
transaction, a service is rendered and a product is either con-
sumed or supplied during the course of the service. While the
South Carolina Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the
subject, dictum in DeLoach indicates that the court would rec-
ognize a strict liability cause of action in a sale-service hybrid
transaction in which a defective product was supplied or used.219
At this time, it appears clear that South Carolina will not
recognize a cause of action in strict liability in tort unless a de-
fective product is present in the transaction, whether the trans-
action is one of sales or services. Expansion of strict liability in
this area will depend on the court's interpretation of "product"
and the further evolution of that term.
Judy G. Meffert
218. Decisions allowing strict liability include: O'Laughlin v. Minn. Natural Gas Co.,
- Minn. -, 253 N.W.2d 826 (1977) (subcontractor supplied and installed floor furnace
that injured the plaintiff); Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971)(contractor
liable for installation of defective gas fitting in course of remodeling home); Newmark v.
Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969)(beauty parlor liable for application of
defective permanent wave solution). But see Magrine v. Krasnica, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d
129 (1969)(dentist's defective hypodermic needle broke off in patient's jaw); Barbee v.
Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968)(optometrist fitting contact lenses). Those cases not
imposing strict liability frequently concern professionals. See generally Henderson,
supra note 206, at 1050-56; Sales, supra note 206, at 25-36.
A fierce controversy has developed in cases regarding the sale of impure blood. Al-
though the sale of blood is considered a service rather than a sale of goods, some courts
have applied strict liability. In South Carolina, the issue is governed by § 44-43-10 of the
South Carolina Code, which states: "Certain warranties shall not be applicable to trans-
fers of human tissues and blood." See generally Annot., 45 A.L.R.3D 1364 (1972).
219. 275 S.C. at 545, 273 S.E.2d at 769.
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